University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Law Publications

Faculty of Law

Summer 2019

The Trade Facilitation Agreement: is the Doha Development
Round Succeeding?
Maureen Irish
University of Windsor, Faculty of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub
Part of the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Irish, Maureen. (2019). The Trade Facilitation Agreement: is the Doha Development Round Succeeding?.
Trade, Law and Development, 11 (1), 38-51.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/106

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Law Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For
more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Summer, 2019
Vol. XI, No. 1

Trade, Law and Development
10th Anniversary Special Issue:
Trade Facilitation

EDITORIALS

Anirudh Gotety & Rakshita Goyal, Facilitating Trade and
Removing Barriers: A New Epoch for Multilateral Trade?
Nora Neufeld, Great Expectations: How the World Trade
Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement Impacts Trade
and Trade Cooperation

Maureen Irish, The Trade Facilitation Agreement: Is the
Doha Development Round Succeeding?

ARTICLES

Mohammad Saeed, Eleonara Salluzzi, Victoria Tuomisto, et
al., The ‘Rights’ of the Private Sector in the Trade
Facilitation Agreement
Bipin Menon, Trade Facilitation—A Boundless Opportunity
for India
Stephen Creskoff, India’s Path to Improved
Facilitation and Enhanced Economic Development

Trade

Christina Wiederer, The Role of Logistics in Supporting
International Trade and Development—A Literature Review
Hsing-Hao Wu, Refining the WTO Trade Facilitation
Agreement in the Face of an Uncertain Trade Environment:
Challenges and Opportunities

ISSN : 0976 - 2329
eISSN : 0975 - 3346

Trade, Law and Development
Vol. 11, No. 1

2019

PATRON
Poonam Saxena
FACULTY-IN-CHARGE
Rosmy Joan
EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
Anirudh Gotety

Rakshita Goyal
EDITORS

Noyonika Nair
(SENIOR CONTENT)

Radhika Parthsarathy
(MANAGING)

Ipsiata Gupta

Shreya Singh

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Gautami Govindarajan

Averal Sibal
Mihir Mathur

Rishabha Meena
COPY EDITORS
Anirudh Sood
Sahil Verma

Amogh Pareek
Parnika Mittal
Ali Amerjee
Meghana Sharafudeen

Iti Mishra

Apoorva Singh
Sarthak Singla

CONSULTING EDITORS
Dishi Bhomawat
Manu Sanan
Prateek Bhattacharya
Shashank P. Kumar

B. S. Chimni
Jagdish Bhagwati
Ricardo Ramírez Hernández

BOARD OF ADVISORS
Daniel Magraw
M. Sornarajah
Vaughan Lowe

Glenn Wiser
Raj Bhala
W. Michael Reisman

Published by
The Registrar, National Law University, Jodhpur
ISSN : 0976-2329 | eISSN : 0975-3346

Trade, Law and Development
Maureen Irish,The Trade Facilitation Agreement:
Is The Doha Development Round Succeeding?
11(1) TRADE L. & DEV. 38 (2019)

THE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT: IS THE DOHA
DEVELOPMENT ROUNDSUCCEEDING?
MAUREEN IRISH*
The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force on
February 22, 2017. It has re-oriented thinking on special and differential
treatment at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Developing and
least-developed countries can make their obligations conditional on the
receipt of effective technical assistance that creates the necessary relevant
capacity. They can also choose the implementation periods for provisions of
the TFA in accordance with their own needs. These innovative approaches
may be suitable for adoption in other agreements.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Doha Development Round has been a disappointment. When it was initiated
in 2001, there were expectations, or at least hopes, of remedying the perceived
imbalance of the Uruguay Round in which developing countries accepted new
obligations in services and intellectual property without gaining much in return.
Members of the WTO almost reached an agreement on the modalities for a way
forward in 2008, but failed. Negotiations seem permanently stalled. The recent rise
of populist, inward-looking movements in several developed countries has
contributed towards a general sense of malaise.

Professor Emerita, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. I am
grateful for research assistance provided by Radha Lamba, and funding support from the
Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. Email: mirish[at]uwindsor.ca.
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On the other hand, the TFA offers some grounds for optimism. The TFA was
adopted and submitted to the Members for acceptance on November 27, 2014.1 It
entered into force on February 22, 2017 after acceptance by 110 Members.2 Two
years since then, in mid-February 2019, a total of 141 Members have been a party to
the Agreement.3 There had been widespread dissatisfaction with the Uruguay
Round’s approach to special and differential treatment, which merely extended the
time limits for adjustment. The new approach in the TFA gives achoice to
developing and least-developed countries, flips conditionality, and might work to
the general mutual advantage of WTO Members, in accordance with the objectives
of both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (GATT) and the WTO.4
This comment, in the second part, summarizes the negotiating history and
substantive obligations under the TFA. Then, the third part describes the innovative
mechanisms for implementation and technical assistance, which provide special and
differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries.The fourth part
examines these mechanisms in the context of previous GATT and WTO
approaches. The final part considers the suitability of the TFA as a model for other
negotiations in the WTO, concluding on a somewhat positive note, along with its
limitations.
II.

NEGOTIATION AND OBLIGATIONS

Trade facilitation was one of the areas proposed for negotiation in 1996, at the time
of the Singapore Ministerial Conference, which was the first Ministerial Conference
after the formation of the WTO. On four proposed issues, there was no agreement
to undertake negotiations. For the first two, which were investment and
competition, working groups were set up to study their relationships with trade, but
any negotiations were to take place only after an explicit consensus was reached to
that effect at a later date.5 Another working group was set up to study national
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade
Facilitation, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995)
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; The Trade Facilitation Agreement was added to the
Marrakesh Agreement by General Council Decision of November 27, 2014, WTO Doc.
WT/L/940, Annex [hereinafter Trade Facilitation Agreement].
2Trade
Facilitation,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
3Id.
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
I.L.M. 1153; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble (“Being desirous of contributing
to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements”).
5 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, ¶ 20, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996).
1
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policies on the third issue, which was transparency in government procurement
practices.6 On the fourth issue, trade facilitation, the Council for Trade in Goods
was instructed to undertake exploratory work.7 The Secretariat was directed to
provide assistance to developing and least-developed countrymembers to participate
in the work on government procurement and trade facilitation.8
The Doha Development Round was launched at the Ministerial Conference in
2001.9 For all four Singapore issues, it was decided that negotiations could go
forward if modalities were agreed upon, by explicit consensus, at the next Ministerial
Conference.10 In 2003, the Cancun Ministerial Conference failed to reach a
consensus declaration, in part due to disagreement over the Singapore issues.11 In
the Framework Agreement of August 1, 2004, investment, competition and
transparency in government procurement were all rejected as areas for
negotiations.12 There was explicit consensus that negotiations would go ahead on
trade facilitation, on the basis of modalities contained in Annex D of that
document.13 According to that Annex, the negotiations would aim to improve
aspects of certain GATT provisions, to enhance technical assistance and capacity
building, and to support cooperation among customs authorities.14 It was explicitly
recognized that special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed
countries would not be limited solely to extensions of transition periods, and that
any commitments made would depend on the countries’ capabilities.15 Technical
assistance would be provided to developing and least-developed countries for
conducting the negotiations.16 Assistance and capacity building were emphasized for
the implementation of any commitment. If a Member lacked the necessary capacity,
particularly for infrastructure, implementation would not be required.17
6Id.

¶ 21.

7Id.
8Id.

¶ 22.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
10Id. ¶¶ 20, 23, 26, 27.
11 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14 September 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(03)/20 (2003). The trade facilitation negotiations nearly ended at this point, due
to lack of a mandate. Establishing a link between capacity and commitment was key to
resolving the impasse; Nora Neufeld, The Long and Winding Road: How WTO Members Finally
Reached a Trade Facilitation Agreement, 6, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2014-06.
12 Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, ¶ 1(g), WT/L/579 (Aug. 1,
2004).
13Id.
14Id. at Annex D, ¶ 1.
15Id. at Annex D, ¶¶ 2, 3.
16Id. at Annex D, ¶ 5.
17Id. at Annex D, ¶ 6.
9
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The TFA, as finalized, reflects the mandate established in 2004. It clarifies and
expands on the obligations under GATT Article V (freedom of transit), GATT
Article VIII (fees and formalities connected with importation and exportation) and
GATT Article X (publication and administration of trade regulations). The
Agreement contains innovative provisions on technical assistance and capacity
building that conform to the requirements of the mandate. Additionally, it also
supports cooperation among border authorities.
The Agreement addresses the specific topics identified for the negotiations during
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005.18 Article 1 requires prompt
publication of requirements for import, export and transit of goods, using internet
updates to the extent possible and with contact information for enquiry points.
Article 2 provides that the private sector must have the opportunity to know and
comment on any proposed amendments, to the extent practicable. Under Article 3,
states must establish a system of advance rulings that will remain valid for a
reasonable period of time after issuance. Article 4 sets out the procedures for appeal
and review, including the giving of reasons for administrative decisions. Article 5
deals with border inspections and the testing of food, beverages and feedstuffs.
Article 6 contains rules for the imposition of fees and charges connected with
importing and exporting, as well as penalties for breach of customs laws and
regulations. Article 7 sets out the requirements for modern release and clearance of
imports, covering pre-arrival submission of information, electronic payment if
practicable, release on guaranty or surety, risk management, post-clearance audits,
publication of release times, advantageous treatment of authorized economic
operators, expedited shipments and perishable goods. Articles 8 and 9 deal with
official cooperation at shared borders and movement of goods through the territory
under customs control. Article 10 contains the obligations concerning border
formalities, covering simplification of documentary requirements, acceptance of
paper or electronic copies, use of international standards, single window systems for
processing of information, ban on preshipment inspectionsfor tariff classification
and customs valuation purposes,19 ban on new rules requiring the use of customs
brokers, encouragement of the use of common procedures and uniform
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, ¶ 33, Annex E,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005) (These were: publication and availability of
information, time periods, consultation, advance rulings, appeal procedures, impartiality,
fees, formalities, prohibition of consular requirements, border agency cooperation, release,
tariff classification and transit of goods).
19 A footnote to Article 10.5.2 clarifies that this does not preclude inspections for sanitary
and phytosanitary purposes. As well, it should not prevent advance screening for security
purposes. See Maureen Irish, Trade, Border Security, and Development, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 81 (Yong-Shik Lee et al.
eds., 2011).
18
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documentation, treatment of rejected goods, temporary admission of goods and
inward or outward processing. Article 11 contains the rules on goods in transit.
Cooperation among border authorities is governed by Article 12. Where there are
reasonable grounds to doubt the accuracy of a declaration, Members can request the
assistance of the authorities of another Member to verify information, including
information in documents filed with the requested Member such as invoices,
packing lists, certificates of origin and bills of lading. The request must be written
and detailed, and must contain an explanation of its purpose. All information
received is subject to confidentiality obligations set out in Article 12.5.1 and Article
12.5.11. The requested Member should not be subject to an unmanageable
administrative burden, given the practical limits on its resources. If there is no
agreement on the prioritization among requests, the requested Member may use its
own discretion regarding execution. If the requesting Member would itself have
difficulty complying with a similar request, or if the requesting Member has not yet
implemented Article 12, then the execution of a request is at the discretion of the
requested Member.
III.

SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

Section II of the TFA contains the innovative provisions on special and differential
treatment for developing countries and least-developed countries. Implementation
of provisions of the Agreement depends on the capacity of a developing or leastdeveloped Member. If the necessary capacity is lacking, implementation is not
required.20
Developing and least-developed country Members can decide to implement their
TFA obligations in accordance with three categories, and the commitments under
each category would be notified by the concerned country itself.21 Category A covers
obligations that became binding on February 22, 2017, when the TFA came into
force, or, in the case of a least-developed country Member, up to one year later,- on
February 22, 2018.22 Category B is for commitments that become binding after a
transition period. By February 22, 2018, developing countries had to give notice of
these commitments and the corresponding transition periods.23 Least-developed
countries are also required to give notice of category B commitments and
corresponding transition periods on the same date, and will have to confirm those
designations and dates generally within two years after their notification, by February
Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, art.13.2.
art. 14.2.
22Id. art. 15.
23Id. arts. 16.1(a)-(b) (A developing country could request an extension of the notification
deadline).
20

21Id.
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22, 2020.24 Category B adopts the usual mechanism of transition periods, but each
developing or least-developed Member chooses its own transition period.That
change in itself is a major breakthrough. Further, the process of self-selection for
commitments applies to all the obligations in Articles 1 to 12 of the TFA.25 This
approach represents a significant reform of special and differential treatments.
Individual countries choose their commitments on substantive matters, and not
solely their tariff cutting commitments. Note that these commitments do not operate
on the basis of direct reciprocity, except for border agency cooperation in Article
12. Developing and least-developed Members are fully Members, whatever the level
of their commitments are, and are entitled to the benefits of all TFA obligations of
other Members.
Category C is even more innovative. It covers the commitments that become
binding after a transition period, if the developing or least developed country has
acquired capacity to fulfil them as a result of assistance and support for capacity
building. By February 22, 2017, developing countries had to give notice of their
Category C commitments, corresponding indicative dates for implementation and
the assistance and support required.26 For least-developed countries, the date for
notification of Category C commitments was one year later, on February 22, 2018,
and the indication of assistance and support required was due one year after that, on
February 22, 2019.27 Notifications are made to the Committee on Trade Facilitation
(the Committee) established pursuant to Article 23.1 of the TFA, which is open to
participation by all Members. The Committee can set up subsidiary bodies to handle
its responsibilities for the administration of the Agreement,28 including the Category
C mechanism.
Donor Members assisting developing and least-developed country Members for
capacity building report annually to the Committee on the status and amount of the
assistance and support provided, the procedures for disbursement, the beneficiary
Member or region, and the responsible agency within the donor governments.29
Donor Members and beneficiary Members provide the Committee with contact
points for information and coordination.30 The Committee may also receive
information from relevant international and regional organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
24Id.

arts. 16.2(a)-(b) (A least-developed country may request an extension for the notification
of its definitive dates for implementation).
25Id. art. 13.1.
26Id. art. 16(1)(c).
27Id. art. 16(2)(c),(d).
28Id. art. 23.1.3.
29Id. art. 22.1.
30Id. arts. 22.2, 22.3.
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Development (UNCTAD), the World Customs Organisation (WCO), United
Nations Regional Commission (UNRC), the World Bank or its subsidiary bodies,
regional development banks, and other agencies of cooperation.31 Donor Member
countries provide the assistance and support to developing and least-developed
countries on mutually agreed terms, either bilaterally or through appropriate
international organizations.32 The Committee holds at least one dedicated session
per year to review the provision of assistance for capacity building, including the
situation of any developing or least-developed country Members not receiving
adequate assistance and support.33
On February 22, 2018, one year after entry into force of the TFA, developing
country Members and donor Members had to provide the Committee with
information on arrangements made for the assistance and support to enable the
developing country to implement its Category C obligations.34 Within eighteen
months of the provision of this information, on August 22, 2019, a progress report
is due and the developing country shall list its definitive dates for implementation.35
Least-developed country Members and relevant donor countries have until February
22, 2021, that is, four years after the entry into force, to give the Committee the
information on arrangements made for assistance and support.36 Further, on August
22, 2022, that is, eighteen months after the provision of this information, a progress
report is due and the least-developed country shall give notice of its definitive dates
for implementation.37
The TFA has rigorous deadlines for setting the time for implementation of Category
B and Category C commitments, but does not restrict the length of transition time
that a country can choose,38 with one exception. The Secretariat is to give developing
and least-developed countries a three-month reminder of the duty to set definitive
dates for implementation of Category B and Category C obligations. If no such dates
are set, implementation is to take place within one year from the time of setting of
the definitive dates.39 Developing and least-developed countries having difficulty
submitting definitive dates due to lack of donor support need to report this to the
31Id.

art. 22.5.
art. 21.1.
33Id. art. 21.4.
34Id. art. 16.1(d).
35Id. art. 16.1 (e).
36Id. art. 16.2(d).
37Id. art. 16.2(e).
38 Bernard Hoekman, The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone,
Mistake or Mirage, 15(Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance
Programme-132,
Working
Paper
RSCAS
2014/102,
2014),
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33031/RSCAS_2014_102.pdf?sequence=1.
39 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16.4.
32Id.
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Committee as soon as possible, as the Committee has power to extend the deadline
for notification.40
A developing or a least-developed country that considers it will have difficulty in
implementing an obligation in time should give an advanced warning to the
Committee. The warning shall include a new date for implementation and an
explanation of the reasons for the delay.41 Developing countries are entitled to an
additional time of eighteen months for implementation,42 while least-developed
countries are entitled to an additional time of three years for implementation.43
Countries can request a longer first extension and the Committee shall give a
sympathetic consideration to such a request.44 Furthermore, countries have the
power to shift their commitments between Category B and Category C and can
request an examination by the Committee of a request for extra time.45
A developing or least-developed country can notify the Committee that it is unable
to meet a Category C obligation, as implementation is not required if the country
lacks the required capacity, according to Article 13.2.46 An Expert Group will then
be established to review the matter and make a recommendation to the Committee.47
In the case of a least-developed country, the Committee shall, as appropriate,
facilitate the acquisition of capacity.48 A developing country Member is immune
from proceedings on the issue under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
until the first meeting of the Committee, after it has received the recommendation
of the Expert Group.49 A least-developed country Member is immune from the DSU
for twenty four months after the first Committee meeting following the Expert
Group’s recommendation or until the Committee makes a decision, whichever is
earlier.50 The Committee makes decisions after considering the recommendations
from the Expert Group, but it does not have the dispute-resolution powers of the
DSU.
These provisions are aimed at implementation rather than a finding of breach of an
obligation under the DSU. For Category A commitments, developing countries were

40Id.

art. 16.3.
art. 17.1.
42Id. art. 17.2.
43Id. art. 17.2.
44Id. arts. 17.3, 17.4.
45Id. art. 19.
46Id. art. 18.1.
47Id. art. 18.2.
48Id. art. 18.4.
49Id. art. 18.5.
50Id. art. 18.5.
41Id.
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immune from DSU proceedings for two years after entry into force.51 For Category
A commitments, least-developed countries are immune from the DSU for six years
after entry into force.52 For Categories B and C, least developed countries are
immune from the DSU for a full eight years after implementation of the
commitment.53 Even if the grace period has expired, Members are required to
exercise due restraint concerning complaints against least-developed country
Members.54 Moreover, Article 13.2 cannot be amended by the Expert Group, the
Committee or the Panel and Appellate Body in DSU proceedings. Article 13.2
emphasizes the fundamental understanding from the modalities in 2004 that if a
developing or least-developed country Member continues to lack capacity, then
implementation is not required.
IV.

DEVELOPMENT, GATT AND THE WTO

The detailed provisions on special and differential treatment were not elaborated in
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 2005. The innovative mechanisms for
developing and least-developed country Members in the TFA are the result of
lengthy and careful negotiations since that time.
There are two main features that are unique in these provisions.The first is the optin, which allows developing and least-developed Members to establish their own
deadlines for implementation of obligations. Some deadlines must be notified at the
time of entry into force of the Agreement. Others are notified after the entry into
force. Each developing or least-developed country Member has the opportunity to
match its obligations to its economic situation, within the terms of the TFA. The
second unique feature is the link between capacity and commitment. Developing
and least-developed country members can choose to make implementation
contingent on receiving technical assistance that is effective and that builds the
required relevant capacity. Donor Member countries have reporting obligations for
the assistance they provide. Both the opt-in and the capacity/commitment link
switch control to developing and least-developed countries and give them flexibility
to respond to the challenges that each one faces. The overall approach is similar to
the positive list technique in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. In that
agreement, developing countries determine their own level of commitment and can
attach conditions promoting their participation in world trade.55 In the TFA,
51Id.

art. 20.1.
art. 20.2.
53Id. art. 20.3.
54Id. art. 20.4.
55 General Agreement on Trade in Services, arts. IV, XIX.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33
I.L.M. 1167; See MANUELA TORTORA, UNITED Nations Conference on Trade and
52Id.
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obligations arise after a transition period of the Member’s choice and in accordance
with its own capacity. Moreover, obligations can be contingent onthe receipt of
technical assistance that has successfully created the needed capacity for
implementation. Is the TFA a new ray of hope for development at the WTO?
There is considerable disappointment over the lack of progress in the Doha Round,
which was meant to correct the imbalances resulting from the Uruguay Round.56
Frank Garcia argues that the Uruguay Round moved the WTO from the
development model of the 1979 Enabling Clause,57 to a new paradigm of timelimited adjustment to a free market level playing field. He maintains that while open
trade may be necessary, it is not sufficient for successful economic development.58
A return to a development model would entail a number of features, including
transition periods linked to objective economic and social criteria, so that extensions
would be available until capacity is established.59
The TFA marks a return to the development model through linkages between
capacity and commitment, with technical assistance and capacity assessment geared
towards specific provisions in the Agreement. The 1979 Enabling Clause expresses
the same link. The graduation principle in Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause
contains the expectation that developing countries will make greater trade
concessions and contributions once their economies improve.60 The non-reciprocity
principle in Paragraph 5 of the Clause emphasizes that developing countries are not
expected to make concessions that are inconsistent with their needs.61 Moreover,
Paragraph 5 also provides that developed countries “shall not seek” such
concessions that are beyond a developing country’s capacity.62 The idea of a link
between capacity and commitment is a longstanding part of GATT and WTO
thinking on special and differential treatment. The TFA applies it to particular
obligations and relies on technical assistance to produce the needed capacity.
Furthermore, the TFA involves donor countries in related ongoing reporting
obligations.
Development, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE SKELETON IN THE CLOSET 4 ( 2003).
56Sunjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’’L. L. J.
573, 575 (2010).
57 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT Doc. L/4903, BISD 26S/203
[hereinafter Enabling Clause].
58 Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27(1) B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV.
291, 299-300 (2004).
59Id. at 307.
60 Enabling Clause, supra note 57, ¶ 7.
61Id. ¶ 5.
62Id.
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The transition periods in the TFA aim for a level playing field of obligations, with a
few that are ‘best efforts’ undertakings, especially for the use of electronic
communication technology. The substantive commitments are not distinct to
developing and least-developed Members, although the timing is distinct for the
circumstances of each developing or least-developed country. It will be important
to emphasize that if capacity is lacking, “implementation of the provision(s)
concerned will not be required until implementation capacity has been acquired”, in
the terms of Article 13.2 of the Agreement. This proviso was fundamental to the
success of the negotiations. In addition, acquisition of capacity involves the activity
of the donor countries, as well as the recipient countries.
There are ways in which the TFA experiment might fail. First, the operation of the
Agreement depends on voluntary participation of both sides, the developed
countries as well as the developing and least developed countries. Developed
country Members accepted that technical assistance ‘should’ be provided,63 and that
they would ‘facilitate’ such support for capacity-building.64 The support can be
provided bilaterally or through various international organizations, such as the IMF,
the OECD, UNCTAD, the WCO, the UNRC, the World Bank or their subsidiary
bodies, regional development banks, and other agencies of cooperation.65 There is a
long history of voluntary tariff preferences being reduced in effectiveness as they
came to reflect donor country interests rather than those of the recipient countries
alone.66 Perhaps the supervision by the Committee,67 and the various institutions of
the global public sector will guard against the risk of donor conditionality. A second
potential concern is that technical assistance funding requires transparency and
accountability to meet the purpose of capacity-building.68 The reporting obligations
in the TFA should assist with supervision, although it is less clear whether assistance
can be coordinated when several agencies with individual mandates are involved,69
along with technical assistance from the private sector.70 The focus on specific
Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 13.2, 21.2.
art. 21.1.
65Id. arts. 21.1, 22.5.
66 Thomas R. Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries:
International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT’L. L. 513 (1978); Thomas P.
Cutler, The United States Generalized System of Preferences: The Problem of Substantial Transformation,
5(3) N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 393 (1980); D. Robert Webster & Christopher P. Bussert,
The Revised Generalized System of Preferences: ‘Instant Replay’ or a Real Change?, 6(4) NW. J. INT’L.
L. & BUS. 1035 (1984-85); See Hoekman, supra note 38, at 16.
67 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 23.1.
68 Marjorie Florestal, Technical Assistance Post-Doha: Is There Any Hope of Integrating Developing
Countries into the Global Trading System?, 24(1) ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 121 (2007).
69See Hoekman, supra note 38, at 25.
70 Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 21.3(c).
63

64Id.
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technical assistance to meet particular provisions of the TFA should make
supervision somewhat easier than it is for more general economic development
programmes, but management may be challenging.
At the meeting of the Committee on Trade Facilitation in mid-February 2019, the
WTO Secretariat reported that the TFA had been ratified by 86% of WTO
Members. The overall rate of commitments implementation was 61.3%, seeing a
100% implementation by the developed countries, 60.3% by the developing
countries and 22.8% by the least developed countries.71 The provisions attracting
the highest rates of implementation commitments are: Article 9 movement of goods,
Article 10.5 pre-shipment inspection, Article 10.6 use of customs brokers, Article
5.2 detention and Article 10.9 temporary admission of goods.72 These provisions
relate to traditional procedures for movement of goods and customs clearances. It
can be expected that many WTO Members are already in compliance or might find
compliance relatively easy. The provisions attracting the lowest rates of
implementation commitments are: Article 8 border agency cooperation, Article 7.6
average release times, Article 3 advance rulings, Article 5.3 test procedures, Article
7.7 authorized operators and Article 10.4 single window.73 These last provisions are
of more recent vintage in customs administration, linked to the use of modern
information technology or recent innovations in practice such as the use of trusted
trader programmes. For these provisions, compliance could be challenging for
developing and least-developed country Members. Technical assistance might help
with matters such as legal reform or the training of personnel. If a commitment
involves new computer hardware or software, there could be a question of ongoing
funding for upgrades and replacement equipment. A country would need to be
assured of its long-term capacity before deciding to implement such measures.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The TFA has re-oriented the discussion in the WTO around special and differential
treatment for developing and least-developed countries. There are approaches to
consider other than a general time-limit for adjustment to a harmonized obligation.
The Agreement uses two new features that provide more flexibility. First, developing
and least-developed country Members can opt-in to the time for implementation of
individual provisions of the Agreement. Second, the Agreement links capacity and
discuss progress and assistance on Trade Facilitation Agreement’s 2 nd year, WORLD TRADE
ORG.
(Feb.
12,
2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/fac_14feb19_e.htm.
72Trade
Facilitation
Agreement
Database,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.tfadatabase.org/implementation/progress-by-measure (last visited May 17,
2019).
73Id.
71Members
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commitment. Developing and least-developed countries can choose to make specific
obligations conditional on acquiring capacity through technical assistance from
other Member countries. There is no obligation if there is no capacity. These features
may or may not be suitablein other areas of WTO law.
The opt-in feature that allows developing and least-developed countries to choose
the implementation date for specific provisionsmay work best incertain
contexts.Trade facilitation is intended to benefit traders in general. Implementation
will be easier for some countries than for others and small businesses will face greater
challenges than larger firms with more staff. The intent, however, is that the benefit
is general and available across a range of commercial sectors. A negotiation on trade
facilitation does not depend on the win/loss assumptions of mercantilist bargaining,
in which the interests of exporters of one product from one country are balanced
against the interests of exporters of another product from another country.If
negotiators need to be able to predict defined balances and trade-offs, they would
face difficulties if the level of implementation at the time of signing is not known.
Of course, there will always be some unpredictability over how many countries will
agree to a given deal. Differing obligations and delayed implementation create an
additional level of uncertainty. The opt-in feature may work best in areas such as
rules’ negotiations, where there can be general benefits, and negotiations are not only
about win/loss results.74
The link between capacity and commitment is a long-established part of GATT and
WTO thinking. The unique aspects in the TFA are the recognition of choice by
developing and least-developed countries, the link to donor-provided effective
technical assistance and the Expert Group that reviews a Member’s self-assessment
of capacity before a dispute goes to the DSU. The United Nations climate change
negotiations acknowledge a similar general link between the receipt of fundingand
the ability ofdeveloping countries to make commitments. The Paris Agreement
recognizes that support for developing countries will enhance their capability to
combat climate change and its effects.75 In consequence, developed countries now
agree to provide financial resources to developing countries, at least in principle.76
The idea that developed countries must pay for certain reforms by developing
countries may be increasingly accepted. The TFA is an example of this principle in
a specific context. The idea of payment for reform is only suitable if there is some
Ben Czapnik, The Unique Features of the Trade Facilitation Agreement: A Revolutionary New
Approach to Multilateral Negotiations or the Exception Which Proves the Rule?, 18(4) J. INT’L. ECON.
L. 773 (2015).
75 Paris Agreement (Dec. 13, 2015),art. 4(5), in UNFCCC, COP Report No. 21, Addendum,
at 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add, 1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
76Id. at arts. 9(1), 10(6). (Article 11(4) requires all Parties involved in capacity-building to
report regularly on progress).
74

Summer, 2019]

The TFA: Is The Doha Development Round Succeeding?

51

expectation of benefit for all. The world’s climate is obviously a shared resource and
global warming is a shared concern. In the context of the TFA, border
administration that is more efficient, more reliable and more transparent is intended
to benefit traders in general. This is not an area for the win/loss assumptions of
mercantilist bargaining. Moreover, the emphasis on technical assistance and capacity
building in the negotiations may have promoted the identification of practicommon
interests. Certain aspects of the TFA, such as choice by developing countries,
obligations being conditioned on the receipt of effective technical assistance, and
expert capacity assessment prior to full dispute settlement, will not be suitable for
all topics in WTO negotiations. Like the opt-in feature, they may have some use in
areas where specific obligations and capacities can be linked, and where there is some
expectation of overall general benefit.
Flexibility for developing and least-developed countries is a hallmark of the TFA.
The Agreement marks the end of the Single Undertaking approach from the
Uruguay Round, which required all WTO Members to acceptan entire package of
agreements. The TFA entered into effect on acceptance by two-thirds of the
Members,and is binding only on those who have accepted it.77 As Meredith Kolsky
Lewis points out, the views of developed and developing countries have been at
odds since the founding of the WTO and divergences are strong as the Doha
Development Round appears to be faltering.78 The opt-in feature and the
capacity/commitment link in the TFA demonstrate that flexibility is possible in at
least some areas. The ray of hope is not a strong one, but perhaps the Doha
Development Round can produce some successes that respond to the needs of
developing and least-developed country Members. Perhaps the TFA will be an
example of the ‘balanced rules and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical
assistance and capacity-building programmes’ that were envisaged at Doha.79

77Marrakesh

Agreement, supra note 1, art. X (3).
The Embedded Liberalism Compromise in the Making of the GATT and Uruguay
Round Agreements, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE
EMBEDDED LIBERALISM COMPROMISE REVISITED 12, 25-27 (Gillian Moon & Lisa Toohey
eds., 2018).
79 Doha Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 2.
78Meredith K. Lewis,

